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This essay summarizes some of the main ideas behind
proposals for a new development agenda. It highlights first
the need to strike a new balance between the market and the
public interest, and to understand by “public policies” any
initiative organized in pursuit of common goals, and not
just State actions. The author makes five proposals for a
new agenda: i) more balanced globalization with genuine
respect for diversity, underpinned by a network of regional
institutions; ii) a broad view of macroeconomic stability and
the role of countercyclical policies; iii) the use of
development strategies to foster innovation and production
complementarities, without which macroeconomic policies
are insufficient to generate dynamic growth; iv) improved
social linkages, through long-term equity and inclusion
policies, complemented by economic growth to create
sufficient high-quality employment and measures to reduce
structural heterogeneity among production sectors;
v) subordination of the economic system to broader social
objectives.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 18
A NEW LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA  •  JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO
I
Introduction
Liberalization was presented to the developing world
as providing a way out of inefficient strategies
associated with trade protection and high levels of State
intervention, as well as the rent-seeking behaviour that
those strategies encouraged. It was also seen as a means
of fully exploiting the opportunities generated by
globalization. This view represented a significant break
with the idea, which underlay development strategies
for several decades, that “late industrialization” required
a significant degree of State intervention in order to
succeed. The Washington Consensus provided one of
the best summations of this reform agenda, although it
certainly did not reflect its most radical version, which
called for a minimalist State (Williamson, 1997). It was
also, it should be added, a manifestation of the optimism
that the reform agenda generated a decade ago.
During the last few years, the wisdom behind this
vision has been called into question. The Asian crisis
was what probably dealt it the hardest blow. That crisis
made patently clear that, without an adequate
institutional setting, financial liberalization could be the
source of severe macroeconomic instability. The strong
views expressed by “global civil society” since Seattle
indicate that globalization itself is now being questioned
and reflect a basic substratum of discontent in the
industrialized world. In developing countries,
disenchantment with reforms is also growing, but its
political manifestations are more disorganized and its
agenda unclear.
More broadly, dissatisfaction with the results of
reforms is on the rise. Trade and foreign direct
investment have boomed, but the “promised land” of
high growth rates is increasingly regarded as a mirage.
In Latin America –the region where reforms have gone
the furthest– growth in the 1990s was only 3.2% a year,
far below the 5.5% record set during the three decades
of State-led development from the 1950s to the 1970s.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s performance, and that of the least
developed countries in general, continues to be highly
insufficient. Many transition economies still have levels
of economic activity below those seen prior to the “big
bang”. Although most of the Asian economies that
underwent the crisis did recover, they are still struggling
with its financial repercussions. Notable exceptions are
obviously China and India, which are certainly not on
the list of the most highly reformed economies. Even
in the industrialized world, growth in the 1990s was
still far from what it was in the “golden age” of 1950-
1973; the United States did reach those rates, but only
during the second half of the decade.
Distributive tensions are running high and are
probably intensifying. Income disparities between
developed and least developed countries continue to
increase (UNDP, 1999). Income distribution has
worsened in a broad group of both developed and
developing countries. According to one account, the
countries where income distribution has worsened
contain 57% of the world’s population and those where
it has improved 16%, with the remainder experiencing
no clear trend (Cornia, 1999). The growing skills-based
income differential is a worldwide phenomenon. Debate
continues as to whether it is the result of trade
liberalization, technological trends or a weakening of
social safety nets. The asymmetry existing between
factors that cross international borders (capital, highly
skilled labour) and those that cannot (low-skilled
labour), together with the increasing difficulties
governments are having in providing social safety nets,
are certainly part of the explanation (Rodrik, 1997).
Recent events and the discontent they have
generated have, in turn, spurred a constructive debate
that promises to enrich the development agenda. The
last few years have indeed made the debate somewhat
more pluralistic. Alternative views of development
have made some headway. New areas of emphasis
–institution-building, social safety nets and the
“ownership” of development policies, to name a few–
have been brought into the international policy debate.
Is this an indication that the development agenda is in
fact changing? Perhaps, but this is still unclear. Indeed,
new concepts and areas of emphasis are often mere
“add-ons” to what is, by and large, the same policy
agenda, with new generations of reforms simply being
appended to what are regarded essentially as the correct
A prior version of this paper was presented at the American
Economic Association Annual Meeting Panel “Toward a Post-
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foundations. Seen in a less favourable light, they are
merely new garments draped over the same ideas.
Markets, particularly financial markets, have not really
internalized the need for a new development agenda,
and financial agents continue to call for more
liberalization at the national and world levels, i.e.,
plainly for more of the “first generation” of reforms.
This remains the dominant force in a world of weakened
national polities and an even weaker transition to a
global polity.
This paper summarizes some of the basic concepts
underlying the call for a new development agenda.1 Two
intersecting themes in the literature on this subject
should be emphasized at the outset. The first is the call
for a new balance between the market and the public
interest. This should not be viewed as running counter
to the operation of the market, since actions that ensure
an adequate supply of public goods, help to complete
markets, assist non-competitive markets to function
properly, exploit positive and avoid negative
externalities, or ensure an equitable distribution of the
benefits of development, can serve as powerful
mechanisms for enhancing market development
through a variety of economic, social and political
channels. An assertive public policy approach of this
sort will be, if correctly applied, more market-friendly
than the alternative approaches that tended to
predominate during the first wave of reforms.
The second theme is that, rather than being
restricted to State actions, the concept of public policy
should be understood as any organized form of action
that pursues objectives of collective interest. This
definition of public policy is in keeping with an
awareness of the need to open up opportunities for
participation by civil society and to work to overcome
a crisis of the State that affects the developing world
and, indeed, the world at large. It thus aims at correcting
both “market failures” and “government failures” and,
more generally, at building and rebuilding institutions
(or, in the terminology of the new institutional literature,
institutions and organizations). This is unquestionably
one of the most complex tasks awaiting the developing
and transition economies. Moreover, it is the most
pressing task –yet at the same time one that has so far
received insufficient attention– in the process of
building a better international order.
II
A more balanced form of globalization
based on a genuine respect for diversity
The need to “civilize” the global economy (Helleiner,
2000) or, in the words of the United Nations Millennium
Declaration, “to ensure that globalization becomes a
positive force for all the world’s people” (United
Nations, 2000) is the most crucial issue. Although
powerful technological and economic processes
underlie it, there is no doubt that the globalization
process can be shaped, and indeed the form that it has
been assuming has largely been shaped by explicit
policy decisions.
The most troublesome aspect of this situation is
the incomplete and even lopsided character of the
current globalization process and the international
policy agenda that accompanies it, which is reproducing
long-standing asymmetries in the world economy and
creating new ones. Four issues figure prominently in
the current agenda: free trade, intellectual property
rights, investment protection, and financial and capital-
account liberalization. The latter has been the object of
various qualifications during recent crises, including
the proviso that it should be well sequenced and that
emphasis should be given to longer-term flows and to
institutional development. Moreover, in the area of
trade, liberalization is, in turn, incomplete and
asymmetric, as “sensitive” items of great interest to the
developing countries are subject to the highest levels
of protection in the industrialized world.
Meanwhile, other issues are conspicuously absent
from the current agenda: labour mobility; international
rules on taxation, particularly of capital (essential to
guarantee adequate taxation of this highly mobile
factor); the design of truly international competition
1
 References have been kept to a minimum, although the literature
on the topic is extensive.
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rules and codes of conduct for multinational firms; and
compensatory financing to ensure the inclusion of those
countries and social groups that tend to be left behind
in the globalization process.
This is, in turn, a reflection of the most serious
asymmetry of all: the imbalance between the rapid
globalization of (some) markets and the conspicuous
absence of a truly international social agenda. The latter
is, in fact, largely confined to the definition of common
international principles (through United Nations
summits) and the as yet incipient emergence of
international legislation. The decline of official
development assistance (ODA) is one of the most
compelling pieces of evidence of the lack of
commitment to a truly international social agenda, as
is the growing conditionality that is attached to
international financial support in general.
More broadly, it is increasingly being recognized
that globalization has underscored the need to provide
a number of global public (political, social, economic
and environmental) goods, as many previously national
(and, further back in history, local) public goods are
increasingly becoming global in nature (Kaul, Grunberg
and Stern, comps., 1999). There is, however, a striking
contrast between the recognition of this fact, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the weakness of
international arrangements to provide such public goods
and the low level of funding allocated for this purpose.
These asymmetries obviously reflect basic political
features and aspects of the world’s political economy.
The lopsided character of the current globalization
process and agenda undoubtedly reflects the
predominance of major countries and large multi-
nationals. However, it also reflects the disorganization
of many actors, particularly developing countries, in
the international policy debate. This state of affairs is
associated not only with a weakening of the historical
mechanisms for concerted action by developing
countries (e.g., the Group of 77), but also with the
“policy competition” that globalization itself has
generated (i.e., the strong incentive that each country
has –in this era of mobile capital and increasingly
footloose production– to claim that it is a more attractive
investment site than other nations). Thus, the
asymmetries characterizing world power relations and
the high cost of generating international coalitions to
compensate for those asymmetries have become even
more important today.
A complicating feature of the political situation
and of the political economy is obviously the reluctance
of most countries to give up economic sovereignty to
international organizations. Under the influence of the
strong market forces characteristic of globalization,
which tend to weaken nation States, and the unilateral
national liberalization processes that have been taking
place simultaneously, government regulations have
weakened worldwide. Many analysts perceive this result
as an advance, but it is also a source of significant
distortions and risks, particularly –but not only– in the
area of finance. It should be added that, although open
regionalism is also a feature of globalization, and strong
integration forces have been at work in many parts of
the developing world (e.g., Latin America and South-
East Asia), this has not led to strong developing-country
coalitions. Indeed, the European Union aside (and even
in this case only in a limited sense), countries are also
unwilling to give up their sovereignty to regional
organizations.
These political and political economy features have
major implications for international reform. The most
obvious are that the pressure for substantive reform will
be weak, and thus that a more balanced globalization
agenda and stronger global governance may not
materialize, that any balanced negotiation process
would be cumbersome, and that negotiation processes
may underestimate or bypass the interests of certain
actors altogether. The lack of truly international
institutions also means that institutions that have
developed in the past at the national level will not be
available at the global level or will only have limited
functions.
Because of the incompleteness of the relevant
international arrangements, weaker actors should
continue to demand national autonomy in crucial areas,
particularly in terms of the choice of economic and
social development strategies. Moreover, national
autonomy is the only system that is consistent with the
promotion of democracy at the world level. There is
indeed no sense in promoting democracy if
representative and participatory processes at the
national level are given no role in shaping economic
and social development strategies. This is also
consistent with the view that institution-building, social
cohesion and the accumulation of human capital and
technological capabilities (knowledge capital) are
essentially endogenous processes. To borrow a term
from Latin American structuralism, development can
only come “from within” (Sunkel, 1993). Support for
these endogenous processes, respect for diversity and
the design of rules that allow it to flourish are essential
elements of a democratic, development-oriented world
order.
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A final, crucial implication is that no international
architecture is neutral in terms of the equilibrium of
international relations. In this sense, an international
system that relies on a very small number of world
institutions will be less balanced than one that relies on
a network of regional institutions, and countries with
very limited power in the international arena will be
better off if they are active participants in regional
schemes. These regional schemes can indeed provide
degrees of freedom and mutual support that would not
be available at the national level. The international order
should thus provide ample scope for strong regional
institutions while at the same time upholding a rules-
based global order (i.e., a system of “open regionalism”,
to borrow a term from the literature on economic
integration). Indeed, operating through regional
institutions may be the best way to gradually build up
a better international order.
III
A broad view of macroeconomic
stability and the role of countercyclical policies
The concept of macroeconomic stability has undergone
considerable changes in the economic discourse over
the past two decades. During the post-war years
dominated by Keynesian thinking, this concept was
basically defined in terms of full employment and stable
economic growth, accompanied by low inflation and
sustainable external accounts. Over time, however,
fiscal balance and price stability moved to centre stage,
while the Keynesian emphasis on real economic activity
took a back seat and eventually began to fade away
altogether.
The consistency that ought to characterize
macroeconomic policies should be oriented by a broad
definition of stability that recognizes that there is no
single correlation between its alternative definitions and
that significant trade-offs may be involved. Two lessons
are particularly important in this regard. The first is that
real instability is very costly. A narrow view of inflation
targeting may thus be as damaging as past
macroeconomic practices that underestimated the costs
of inflation. Recessions entail a significant loss of
resources that may have long-run effects: firms may
sustain irreparable losses in terms of both tangible and
intangible assets (tacit technological and organizational
knowledge, commercial contacts, the social capital
accumulated in the firm, its goodwill, etc.); the human
capital of the unemployed or the underemployed may
be permanently lost; and children may leave school and
never return. Volatile growth leads to a high average
rate of underutilization of production capacity, reducing
productivity and profits and thus adversely affecting
investment (Ffrench-Davis, 1999). The uncertainty
associated with variability in growth rates may
consequently have stronger effects on capital
accumulation than moderate inflation. Indeed, it
encourages “defensive” microeconomic strategies
(i.e., those aimed at protecting the existing corporate
assets of firms that find themselves in an unfriendly
environment) rather than the “offensive” strategies that
lead to high investment rates and rapid technical
change.
The second lesson is that private-sector deficits are
just as costly as public-sector ones. Moreover, risky
private-sector balance sheets may be as damaging as
flow imbalances. In financially liberalized economies,
both may interact in non-linear ways with capital-
account shocks. The lack of rigorous domestic financial
regulation and supervision typical of the early phases
of financial liberalization is part of this, but is certainly
not the whole story. Boom-bust cycles are an inherent
aspect of financial markets. Private spending booms
and risky balance sheets tend to accumulate during
periods of financial euphoria and are the basis for crises
once exceptional conditions normalize. During such
bouts of euphoria, economic agents tend to
underestimate the intertemporal inconsistency that may
be involved in existing spending and financial
strategies. When crises lead to a financial meltdown,
the associated costs are extremely high. Asset losses
may wipe out years of capital accumulation. The
socialization of losses may be the only way to avoid a
systemic crisis, but this will affect future fiscal (or quasi-
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fiscal) performance. Restoring confidence in the
financial system takes time, and the financial sector
itself becomes risk-averse, which undermines its ability
to perform its primary economic functions.
These two lessons are basically interconnected, as
financial boom-bust cycles have been the predominant
source of business cycles in the developing world. The
essential task of macroeconomic policy is thus to
manage them with appropriate countercyclical tools.
The experience of developing countries indicates that
managing volatility requires a combination of three
policy packages, whose relative importance will vary
depending on the structural characteristics and the
macroeconomic policy tradition of each country
(Ocampo, 2000). The first is consistent and flexible
macroeconomic –fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate–
policies aimed at preventing public or private agents
from accumulating excessive levels of debt and at
forestalling imbalances in key macroeconomic prices
(exchange and interest rates) and in the prices of fixed
and financial assets. The second is a system of strict
prudential regulation and supervision with a clear
countercyclical orientation. This means that prudential
regulation and supervision should be tightened during
periods of financial euphoria to counter the mounting
risks incurred by financial intermediaries. The third
element is a liability policy aimed at ensuring that
appropriate maturity profiles are maintained with
respect to domestic and external public and private
commitments. Prudential capital-account regulations
(i.e., those applied during periods of euphoria to prevent
excessive borrowing) can play an essential role both as
a liability policy –encouraging longer-term flows– and
as an instrument that provides additional degrees of
freedom for the adoption of countercyclical monetary
policies.
Managing countercyclical macroeconomic policies
is no easy task, as financial markets generate strong
incentives for developing countries to overspend during
periods of financial euphoria and to overadjust during
crises. Moreover, globalization places objective limits
on national autonomy and exacts a high cost for any
loss of credibility when national policy instruments are
poorly administered. For this reason, it may be
necessary for macroeconomic policy management to
be supported by institutions and policy instruments that
help to provide credibility, including fiscal stabilization
funds and independent central banks. On the other hand,
the explicit renunciation of policy autonomy (e.g., by
adopting hard pegs or a foreign currency) is hardly a
solution to this dilemma. Instead, this simply
predetermines the nature of the adjustment, and may
make business cycles more intense. If this occurs, the
market may not validate (through reduced country risk)
the hypothetical increase in “credibility” generated by
the decision to relinquish policy autonomy.
The basic solution to the dilemma created by
the lack of  adequate degrees of  freedom to
undertake a countercyclical macroeconomic policy
lies in the international arena (Eatwell and Taylor,
2000; Ocampo, 2001). This means that a first,
essential role of international financial institutions,
from the point of view of developing countries, is
to counteract the procyclical effects of financial
markets. This can be achieved by smoothing out
boom-bust cycles at source through adequate
regulation and by providing developing countries
with additional degrees of freedom to adopt
countercyclical policies (e.g., adequate surveillance
and incentives to prevent the build-up of risky
macroeconomic and financial conditions during
periods of financial  euphoria, together with
mechanisms to smooth out adjustments in the event
of abrupt interruptions of private capital flows). A
second, equally essential role is to counter the
concentration of lending by providing access to
those countries and agents that tend to be subjected
to rationing in private international capital markets.
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IV
Macroeconomic policies are not enough:
the role of productive development strategies
The idea that the combination of open economies and
stable macroeconomics –in the limited sense in which
this term has come to be used, i.e., fiscal balances and
low inflation– would by itself spur rapid economic
growth has thus far not been borne out. This has sparked
an unresolved debate concerning the underlying reasons
for this result. The orthodox interpretation is that
markets have not been sufficiently liberalized. This
interpretation runs up against the fact, however, that
the periods of fastest growth in the developing world
during the post-war era, as well as the longest-lasting
episodes of rapid growth (e.g., the East Asian or, most
recently, the Chinese and Indian “miracles” or, in the
past, the periods of rapid growth in Brazil or Mexico),
have not coincided with phases of extensive
liberalization, even in cases where they have involved
the use of the opportunities provided by international
markets on a large scale (which is a more common
though not universal feature).
Two alternative interpretations emphasize other
determinants of aggregate economic growth or market
failures. In the first case, inadequate institutional
development or human capital are seen as the
explanation for slow growth. These factors are certainly
crucial but, here again, this interpretation needs to
explain why faster growth was possible in periods
during which these factors were in even shorter supply.
The second variant emphasizes the fact that, in order
to be efficient, liberalized markets require full-fledged
“mesoeconomic” policies: active competition policies,
public regulation of non-competitive markets or
markets with strong externalities, and the correction of
market failures in factor markets, particularly the
markets for long-term capital, technology, labour
training and land. Policies to correct market failures
are indeed essential to ensure more efficient markets,
and they may also have effects on equity, but the
relationship between these market failures and growth
is less clear. Failures in long-term capital and
technology markets are probably the most important
in this regard.
A more promising line of inquiry draws upon the
different historical variants of structuralism in economic
thinking, broadly defined. This view emphasizes the
close connection among structural dynamics,
investment and economic growth. According to this
view, economic growth is not a linear process, in which
“representative firms” grow or new representative firms
are added and then produce a given set of goods on an
extended scale. It is rather a more dynamic process in
which some sectors and firms grow and move ahead
while others fall behind, thereby completely
transforming economic structures. This process
involves a repetitive phenomenon of “creative
destruction”, to use Schumpeter’s metaphor (1962,
chap. VIII). Not all sectors have the same ability to inject
dynamism into the economy, to “propagate technical
progress”, according to the classical concept advanced
by Prebisch (ECLAC, 1951). The complementarities
(externalities) among enterprises and production sectors,
along with their macroeconomic and distributive effects,
can produce sudden jumps in the growth process or can
block it (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Taylor, 1991 and Ros,
2000) and, in so doing, generate successive phases of
disequilibria, according to Hirschman’s (1961) classical
view. Since technical know-how and knowledge in
general are not available in fully specified blueprints,
the growth path of firms entails an intensive process of
adaptation and learning, closely linked to production
experience, that largely determines the accumulation
of technical, commercial and organizational know-how
(Katz, 1976 and Amsden, 2001).
The common theme in all these theories is the idea
that economic growth is intrinsically tied to the
structural context, which is made up of productive and
technological apparatuses, the configuration of factor
and product markets, the characteristics of
entrepreneurial agents, and the way in which these
markets and agents relate to the external environment.
The leadership exercised by certain sectors and firms
is, in this case, the essential dynamic factor that drives
economic growth. In the developing world, many of
the dynamic forces are associated with the successful
adaptation of activities previously developed in the
industrialized world, through import substitution,
export promotion or a combination of both.
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Although alternative formulations can be used, one
approach that is particularly promising in terms of its
policy orientation emphasizes two essential concepts:
innovation and complementarities (linkages). In this
formulation, innovation is viewed as any economic
activity that introduces a new way of doing things. The
best definition was provided by Schumpeter (1961,
chap. II) almost a century ago: new goods and services,
or new qualities of goods and services; new
production methods or marketing strategies; the
opening of new markets; new sources of raw
materials; and new market structures. The second
concept emphasizes the role of strategic synergies that
–through the externalities that the various economic
agents generate among themselves (Hirschman,
1961)– determine the “systemic competitiveness” of
the relevant production structures (ECLAC, 1990). The
existence of dynamic scale economies is the essential
feature of both innovations and their diffusion, as well
as of the development of complementarities.
Institutional development may be viewed as an
innovation, but it is also an essential ingredient in such
complementarities.
These ideas have recently been used by several
authors to emphasize the need for a productive
development strategy as a basic component of a
dynamic, open developing economy, a long-standing
theme in “late industrialization” (or, more precisely,
late development) literature. Thus, Rodrik (1999) has
made a strong argument for a “domestic investment
strategy” to kick-start growth, and ECLAC (2000) has
referred to the need for a strategy of structural
transformation. The essential role of strong State/
business-sector partnerships is set forth by Amsden
(2001), as is the need for “reciprocal control
mechanisms” that tie incentives to results in order to
ensure that the former do not merely lead to rent-seeking
behaviour.
This interpretation brings out a central feature of
successful development experiences in the past: a
strong industrialization drive built on solid State/
business-sector partnerships. Will opening markets
with neutral incentives, arms-length government-
business relations and multilateral (Uruguay Round)
constraints on traditional development instruments
produce the same result? Or, to be more precise, will
opening markets provide a substitute for active
productive development policies? It remains to be
seen, but the results so far are not encouraging,
although they may be skewed by certain features of
the transition period. The “destructive” elements
generated by the adverse structural shift in the growth/
trade deficit trade-off and the break-up of domestic
linkages and national innovation systems have been
stronger than the “creative” opportunities generated
by the (still insufficient) market access and innovations
introduced by the spread of multinational firms
(Ocampo and Taylor, 1998; UNCTAD, 1999, chap. IV
and ECLAC, 2000). In any case, if the past is a correct
guide and structural interpretations are valid, then the
use of explicit productive development strategies
aimed at encouraging innovation (in the broad sense
of the term) and helping to build up complementarities
would appear to be a better route to take, even in the
open developing economies of today. The international
community should regard such strategies as an
essential ingredient of successful development and
should continue to search for instruments for
implementing such strategies that do not degenerate
into “beggar-thy-neighbour” competition for footloose
production activities.
In the developing countries, a significant
institutional and organizational effort is required to
devise appropriate instruments for active production
policies, as the old apparatuses of intervention were
either dismantled or significantly weakened during the
liberalization phase in many (if not most) of these
countries. An effort must also be made to design
instruments that, aside from being consistent with the
open economies of today, avoid the “government
failures” that characterized some of the tools used in
the past (rent-seeking and cronyism).
The effective incorporation of the sustainable
development agenda is an additional demand being
placed on production strategies today. Indeed, the
degree of environmental degradation generated by
developing countries at intermediate or even low stages
of development indicates that sustainability is hardly a
luxury that can be postponed. This objective involves
much more than conserving the natural resource base.
In essence, it calls for the mobilization of investment
in dynamic production sectors which use clean
production methods and technologies and in which
competitiveness is achieved through the accumulation
of capital in the broad sense of the term (i.e., human,
social, physical and natural capital). A shift in the
developing countries from a reactive to a more proactive
policy in this area is thus crucial, as is its necessary
counterpart: the effective flow of resources from the
industrialized nations to finance the global
environmental agenda based on the principle of shared
but differentiated responsibilities.
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V
Improved social linkages
(integration), and policy tools should therefore be
clearly subordinated to the broader principles. Thus,
targeting should be seen as an instrument for attaining
universal coverage of basic services, and certainly not
as a substitute for universality. Equivalency criteria
should be applied in a way that is not inconsistent with
solidarity. Properly managed, such criteria, along with
decentralization and private-sector participation, are
instruments for achieving efficiency.
To enhance equity, social policy should act upon
the structural determinants of income distribution:
education, employment, wealth distribution and
demographic dependence, as well as their gender and
ethnic dimensions. These factors are the key elements
in the inter-generational transmission of inequality and
poverty. Breaking these intergenerational links is
therefore vital for a successful social strategy. This
should be reflected, in particular, in integrated policies
to assist the poor.
Education is a highly important element in
equitable growth, particularly in the knowledge/
information age. But its objectives clearly go beyond
these “human capital” dimensions: it is also a key factor
in democratic development and strong citizenship, and
more broadly, in self-realization. Its effects on equity
may have been over-emphasized in recent discussions,
however, since in a highly segmented society, education
is also an instrument of segmentation. This factor has
to be taken into serious consideration if education is to
be used to improve equity. Moreover, inadequate high-
quality job creation will defeat efforts made in the area
of education, in terms of both the accumulation of
human capital (at the extreme, it migrates; under more
usual circumstances, it remains underemployed) and
equity (occupational segmentation then multiplies the
effects of educational segmentation). The link between
economic growth and social progress is thus particularly
crucial in this regard. In fact, this, in conjunction with
the other linkages that are mentioned below, clearly
emphasizes the fact that social policy alone is not
enough: it must be supported by a sound macroeconomy
and active production strategies if it is to bear fruit.
In the rapidly changing environment that
characterizes modern economies, the adaptability of
labour to technical change and the business cycle is
In economic terms, social progress may be thought of
as the result of three basic factors: a long-term social
policy aimed at improving equity and guaranteeing
inclusion; economic growth that generates high-quality
employment in adequate quantities; and the reduction
of the structural heterogeneity of production sectors in
order to narrow the productivity gaps between different
economic activities and different economic agents. As
the following section indicates, economic
considerations are obviously not the only criteria to be
used in designing social policy.
The World Bank (2001) has formulated three basic
objectives for a poverty-reduction strategy: opportunity,
security and empowerment. In a revised formulation,
we could argue that equity and inclusion should be
equated with broad access to resources, basic
protections, voice and participation. Equitable access
to resources is the key to equal opportunity, not only in
the economic sense, but also in its social, cultural and
political dimensions. In the specific case of investment
in human capital, this brings out the essential character
of social spending as a productive investment. Basic
protections are necessary to free people from “negative
risks” (sickness, unemployment and, worst of all,
hunger) in order to allow and encourage them to take
“positive risks”, particularly those associated with
innovation. Protection from “negative risks” is intrinsic
in high-quality employment. Ensuring that people have
a voice is essential to guarantee that the interests of the
poor are adequately taken into account in decisions that
affect them. Through participation, poor people become
central actors in building their own future. In many
instances, organized communities have been a basic
instrument of social and economic change and thus a
central element of institution-building.
To achieve these objectives, social policy should
be guided by three basic principles: universality,
solidarity and efficiency (ECLAC, 2000, chap. 3). This
subject has been surrounded by a great deal of confusion
in recent years, as instruments –targeting, criteria of
equivalency between contributions and benefits,
decentralization, private-sector participation– rather
than principles have been guiding social-sector reforms.
Moreover, these guiding principles emphasize the fact
that social policy is a basic instrument of social cohesion
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 116
A NEW LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA  •  JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO
increasingly important. The crucial contributing factors
in this regard are strong labour training schemes;
institutions that enhance cooperation, both at the
national level (social dialogue) and within firms;
adequate social protection, both of an ongoing nature
and of the type needed to cope with adverse events;
and a prudent minimum wage policy. While flexibility
may be an ingredient, provided it is accompanied by
greater protection, it is only one of a number of
alternative instruments. In this regard, it should be
remembered that more flexible labour markets may
adversely impact other factors that have positive effects
on adaptability, particularly labour-business
cooperation. Most importantly, flexibility should not
be seen as a substitute for adequate macroeconomic
policies. Indeed, in an unstable macroeconomic
environment, or in the presence of slow economic
growth, job creation will be weak in any case, and
additional flexibility may lead to a rapid deterioration
in the quality of employment. Flexibility has, in other
words, negative externalities (it may undermine jobs
that would otherwise be stable) that should not be
ignored.
Poor economic growth affects equity in another
way that plays a crucial role in developing countries: it
increases structural heterogeneity. This term, drawn
from the Latin American structuralist school, is
preferred to “dualism” because the heterogeneity that
characterizes developing countries and societies cannot
be described in terms of a duality between a “modern”
and a “traditional” sector and because low-productivity
sectors are continually being created and transformed;
only some of the sectors that are on the decline can be
called traditional. In the absence of strong job creation
in dynamic activities, low-productivity activities
mushroom. This is what happened in Latin America in
the 1990s: the region generated more “world class”
firms (many of them subsidiaries of multinationals) that
were able to integrate successfully into the global
economy, but its low-productivity activities also
increased; in fact, they absorbed 7 out of every 10 new
workers during the years of growth preceding the Asian
crisis (ECLAC, 2000, chap. 1). There is, in fact, no
automatic mechanism that guarantees that rapid
technological innovation in dynamic activities will fuel
swift economic growth: in the absence of adequate
domestic linkages –or if the “destructive” effects of
productive restructuring, and the defensive
microeconomic strategies that accompany them,
predominate– it may simply increase structural
heterogeneity. If this happens, the growth effects will
be weak and additional tensions will be created in
relation to equity.
The links between the modernization of leading
economic sectors and the rest of the economy are thus
crucial, not only for growth but also for equity.
Productive development strategies can play a vital role
in both dimensions. This also underscores the
importance of a good distribution of production assets.
Indeed there is strong evidence that an appropriate
distribution of production assets which generates a
universe of strong small firms is associated with a better
distribution of income (and less concentration of power
in general). Policies aimed at democratizing access to
production assets (capital, technology, training and
land) are thus critical for both growth and equity. Rural
development policies, as well as those aimed at
increasing formalization of microenterprises, fall within
this realm. This should be accompanied by a gradual
extension of social security schemes to workers in small
firms and to the self-employed.
The interaction between human capital and high-
quality employment and the effects of a better
distribution of production assets are only two of the
positive linkages between development and equity.
There may also be favourable political economy
linkages, as well as positive effects through the capital
market and through the linkages among social cohesion,
investment and productivity. Equity-development
linkages were a favourite topic of development literature
in the 1960s. Fortunately, they have now come back to
the forefront of economic thinking (for a recent survey,
see Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa, 1999).
Given the crucial linkages between economic and
social development, integrated policy frameworks
should be designed. Such frameworks should explicitly
take such linkages into consideration, as well as those
existing among social policies (the supportive effects
of different social policies, which may, in particular,
be channelled through integrated poverty eradication
programmes) and among economic policies (macro-
meso connections, particularly to facilitate the
development of dynamic small business sectors). One
of the weakest links, in this regard, is the lack of
appropriate institutions for integrated policy
frameworks. Such institutions should provide for the
active participation of social actors and give a strong
voice to the poor, should be equipped with effective
systems for coordination between economic and social
authorities in which social priorities are
“mainstreamed” into economic policy, and should be
guided by rules that facilitate the “visibility” of the
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social effects of economic policies. These rules should
provide for the consideration of such effects by
macroeconomic authorities (including central banks)
on a regular basis, require budget proposals to include
analyses of distributive effects, stipulate that these
analyses be taken into account by Congress when a
budget proposal is being considered, provide for similar
practices in the case of proposals for tax reforms, etc.
VI
Broader goals
One of the most positive events of the past decade has
been the full realization that development comprises
broader goals (Stiglitz, 1998). The concept of “human
development” or the even more recent concept of
“development as freedom” (Sen, 1999) give expression
to this perspective, but it is clearly a long-standing and
deeply-rooted part of development thinking. Its most
important manifestation is the gradual spread of global
ideas and values, such as those of human rights, social
development, gender equity, respect for ethnic and
cultural diversity, and environmental protection.
Nothing embodies this “globalization of values” more
than the series of declarations issued by United Nations
summits during the 1990s, including the Millennium
Declaration. These global values, and particularly
human rights in their dual dimension (civil and political
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and
cultural rights, on the other), should be regarded as
constituting the ethical framework for the design of
development policy today.
The implications of this perspective run more
deeply than current economic thought is willing to
recognize. The central implication, drawing on
Polanyi’s work (1957), is that the economic system must
be subordinated to broader social objectives. An
emerging issue in this regard is the need to confront
the strong centrifugal forces that characterize private
affairs today. Indeed, in many parts of the developing
(and industrialized) world, people are losing their sense
of belonging to society, their identification with
collective goals and their awareness of the need to
develop ties of solidarity. This fact drives home how
important it is to foster those bonds in order to “create
society” and to arrive at a more widespread awareness
of the social responsibilities of individuals and groups.
Either the State or civil society can take the initiative.
In this sense, as indicated in the introduction to this
paper, “public affairs” should be viewed as the sphere
in which collective interests come together, rather than
as a synonym for State actions. It means, in other words,
that all sectors of society need to participate more
actively in democratic political institutions and that a
wide range of mechanisms need to be developed within
civil society itself to strengthen relationships of social
solidarity and responsibility and, above all, to
consolidate a culture of collective development founded
upon tolerance of differences and a willingness to
compromise.
The enormous intellectual challenges and practical
tasks that are involved in the recognition of these factors
should foster a sense of humility. The idea that “we
already know what must be done” is nothing more than
a sign of arrogance on the part of the economics
profession, which has only worsened since the rise to
dominance of orthodox development thinking in the
1980s. Consideration of the unsatisfactory results of
reforms and of the existing level of social discontent
should –and is– leading many experts to rethink the
development agenda. This is most welcome, but it is at
best an incomplete, ongoing process.
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